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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Laura J. Hickman for the Master of Science in 
Administration of Justice presented July 10, 1995. 
Title: An Assessment of the Impact of Intimate Victim-Offender 
Relationship on Sentencing in Serious Assault Cases. 
It is generally agreed that a criminal justice system reflects the 
values of the society within which it exists. The presence of patriarchal 
social values will likely affect the response of the criminal justice system 
to intimate violence. While the perpetration of violence against another is 
a violation of an important social norm, patriarchal values may function to 
discount the seriousness of such an act, if the violence is perpetrated by a 
man against his girlfriend or wife. This discount of seriousness may lead 
to less severe punishment for men who assault their intimates than to men 
who assault nonintimates. 
The purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that men 
who are convicted of committing serious assaults against female intimates 
receive more lenient punishment than men who are convicted of 
committing serious assault against nonintimates. Punishment was defined 
as sentencing outcomes, i. e. type and length of sentence. The sentences 
of offenders convicted of felony assaults as the major offense and subject 
to sentencing guidelines in Oregon in 1993 were examined. 
2 
Chi-square tests were used to compare the sentence types of 
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders. Two-tailed !-tests and 
multiple linear regression were used to examine the relationship between 
victim-offender relationship and length of sentence. It appears that the 
presence of Oregon's sentencing guidelines, rather than victim-offender 
relationship, had the greatest effect upon the severity of punishment. This 
finding suggests that the guidelines may be responsible for minimizing the 
impact of patriarchal values on sentencing decisions in serious assault 
cases. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Crime is a product of social values and norms. Society, guided by 
its values, create rules, or norms, by which individual members are to live. 
Some norms are considered to be so important to the welfare of society 
that violations of these rules are defined as crimes. In some instances, 
violation of important social rules are excused because they uphold social 
values of a higher order. For example, in American society, homicide is a 
crime, unless the murderer acted in self-defense. In this case, the social 
value placed upon the right to protect one's own life outweighs the social 
prohibition against murder. Violations of social rules that are defined as 
crimes are discouraged partially by the threat of punishment. The severity 
of the punishment typically depends upon the importance of the social 
norm that was violated and the social values relevant to the particular 
situation (Eitzen & Zinn, 1988). For example, a transient who commits a 
crime by selling illegal drugs may be seen as deserving of more severe 
punishment if he or she sells drugs to children than if he or she sells drugs 
to other transients. The same norm has been violated in both cases. The 
latter crime, however, may be seen as a more serious threat to the welfare 
of society and deserving of more severe punishment because the violation 
also conflicts with the high social value placed upon the protection of 
children. 
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Violent assaults are seen as a serious threat to the welfare of society 
and, thus, are defined as criminal behavior and deserving of punishment. 
Violent assaults may be seen as more or less of a social threat, depending 
upon the relevance of important social values in individual situations. The 
present study sought to uncover the effect of patriarchal values on the 
severity of punishment given to individuals who commit serious assaults. 
Specifically, the present study examined whether social values relating to 




Social and legal tolerance of violence against female intimates is 
not unique to American society. The historical record clearly 
demonstrates that men have long treated women as their property (Martin, 
1981; Brownmiller, 1975). Common law tradition, from which American 
law is derived, reflects the wife-as-property philosophy through the 
concept of coverture. Coverture dictates that marriage is a state that 
erases the legal identity of the wife and subjects her body and property to 
the unrelinquishable control and will of her husband (Marcus, 1994; 
Friedman, 1993; Elias, 1986; Szechtman, 1985; Martin, 1981). Common 
law, furthermore, explicitly permitted husbands to physically assault their 
wives, but prohibited beatings with a rod any thicker than the width of the 
man's thumb. American law tended to depart from this "rule of thumb" by 
allowing husbands to physically "discipline" their wives, but not to beat 
them (Marcus, 1994; Klein, 1982). 
In her ground-breaking historical study of family violence in the 
United States, Pleck (1987) traced the evolution of the present socio-legal 
perspective on intimate violence against women. 1 Her work showed that 
the modern feminist movement was only one of three historic American 
1 The term intimate violence is subsumed in the term domestic violence, but 
domestic violence refers to a group of intimate and familial relationships. Intimate 
violence is distinguished from domestic violence in that intimate violence occurs in 
the context of a romantic relationship and not within parent-child, sibling or other 
familial relationships (Fineman & Mykitiuk, 1994; Pleck, 1987). 
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social movements that brought about legal and social reform in the area of 
family violence. The first reform movement took place among the 
Puritans, of the Massachusetts Bay colony, in the mid-seventeenth century. 
These colonists were the first in the new world to pass laws prohibiting 
wife beating and child abuse. The second reform movement occurred 
during the late 19th century and focused on criminalizing alcohol 
consumption. This movement championed abused women and children 
because they were viewed as victims of drunken husbands. The third 
reform movement surfaced in the mid- I 970s, when battered women were 
"discovered" by twentieth century feminists reformers. This third 
movement, propelled by feminist, civil rights and law and order interests, 
brought about the most dramatic social and legal changes in the area of 
intimate violence against women. Largely as a result of these three social 
movements, physically assaulting wives is now a crime in most 
jurisdictions in the United States (Gordon, 1988; Pleck, 1987). 
The mere passage of legislation prohibiting violence against women 
does not guarantee that laws are enforced nor does it ensure that intimate 
violence is seen as a serious social problem (Marcus, 1994; Buzawa & 
Buzawa, 1993; Friedman, 1993; Pleck, 1987; Erez, 1986; Jolin, 1984). A 
body of literature addressing the issue of the criminal justice system's 
response (or lack thereof) to intimate violence has been slowly and 
steadily growing since the last great reform movement of the 1970s. 
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Police response to intimate violence has been an area of particular interest 
of researchers (Dunford, 1992; Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford & Austin, 1986; Berk 
& Newton, 1985; Sherman & Berk, 1984). 
The literature relating to the probability of arrest suggests that 
perpetrators of violent assaults on intimates, whether the victim is married 
to, cohabitating with or dating the assailant, are much less likely to be 
arrested than perpetrators of similar violence against nonintimate victims 
(Cohen, 1994; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Mcferron, 1989; Pleck, 1987; 
Brez, 1986; Gondolf & Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Martin, 1981; Do bash & 
Dobash, 1979; Parnas, 1967). In fact, incidents of intimate assault are 
frequently recorded and referred to by police as "domestic disturbances," a 
label that minimizes the seriousness of such assaults (Stanford & Mowry, 
1990; Brez, 1986; Breslin, 1978). When police do take action in intimate 
assault cases, arrests are most often made on misdemeanor charges, 
regardless of the severity of the injury to the victim, the assailant's 
injurious intent, or involvement of weapons (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; 
Langan & Innes, 1986; Edwards, 1985). 
Public pressure and lawsuits brought against police departments that 
refused to arrest intimate assailants brought about some changes in police 
practices by the early 1980s. But by far the greatest catalyst for radical 
change in arrest practices came from an initial research study conducted 
by Sherman and Berk (1984) in Minneapolis, in 1981. The findings of this 
experimentally designed study revealed that arresting intimate assaulters 
had a greater deterrent effect than other methods of police intervention, 
such as mediation and separation. In the wake of this study, numerous 
police polices and laws were enacted that support or mandate the arrest of 
intimate assaulters (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Gelles, 1993; Gondolf & 
McFerron, 1989; Williams & Hawkins, 1989). 
The Minneapolis study (Sherman & Berk, 1984) was followed by a 
series of replication studies in the cities of Omaha, Milwaukee, Charlotte, 
Metro-Dade County, Colorado Springs and Atlanta. The findings from 
these studies lent only partial support to the deterrent effect of arrest 
found by Sherman and Berk (1984). Because of methodological 
differences the original Minneapolis findings are not fully comparable to 
the multi-city studies. Still, the replication studies did call into question 
the suitability of arrest as the sole response to intimate violence. Arrest 
of intimate violence offenders in the cities of Omaha, Milwaukee and 
Charlotte seemed to increase their assaultive behavior, rather than to 
decrease it. This "backfiring" of arrest in these cities was most clearly 
associated with unemployment among the intimate assailants (Sherman, 
Schmidt & Rogan, 1992). In addition to the Minneapolis study and the 
multi-city replication studies, other researchers have attempted to shed 
light on this issue (Dunford, 1992; Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford & Austin, 1986; 
Berk & Newton, 1985). To date it is not clear whether arrest deters 
6 
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intimate violence in general or if particular types of assaulters, such as the 
employed, are more likely to be discouraged from further assaults by 
arrest than are other types of intimate assaulters (Buzawa & Buzawa, 
1993 ). 
While few studies exist that examine the response of prosecutors 
and courts to cases involving intimate violence, the available evidence 
consistently shows that prosecutors as well as the courts tend to treat 
intimate violence cases differently from stranger violence cases. Intimate 
assault cases at the prosecution and court level tend to be dismissed at a 
disproportionately high rate, downgraded to less serious offenses and 
regarded as needlessly consuming scarce resources (Hart, 1993; Ford, 
1991; McGuire, 1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Pl eek, 19 8 7; 
Langan & Innes, 1986; Lerman, 1986; Ellis, 1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko, 
1982; Davis & Smith, 1981; Martin, 1981; Brosi, 1979; Vera Institute, 
1977). There is little empirical information about the supervision of 
intimate violence offenders within the corrections component of the 
criminal justice system. 
CHAPTER III 
MAJOR THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Several theoretical perspectives currently dominate the literature 
regarding the etiology of, and social response to, intimate violence. 
Proponents of the psychological perspective view intimate assaults as the 
result of some pathology within the individual offender and/or victim (see 
for example, Roy, 1977). Studies of intimate violence originating from 
this perspective seek to uncover perpetrator and/or victim personality 
characteristics, childhood experiences, level of social skill development 
and the like, to explain the presence of violence within intimate 
relationships. Sociological perspectives cite structural factors within 
society as the causes of violence against intimates (Yllo, 198 8). Research 
conducted under the sociological umbrella examines intimate violence in 
the context of social class, race, gender and family systems (see for 
example, Gelles, 1979). Feminist perspectives tend to view patriarchal, or 
male-dominated, social organizations and gender arrangements as the 
sources of intimate violence. 2 They assert that there is a clear distinction 
between male-perpetrated and female-perpetrated intimate violence. 
Intimate violence against women is seen as a much larger and more 
pressing social problem than female violence against male intimates 
because male violence against females is a "normal" part of a patriarchal 
2 A patriarchy is a societal structure that institutionalizes male control of 
women, both within intimate relationships and within the larger society (Lerner, 
1986). 
society. Feminist-oriented studies of violence against women focus on 
gender inequality, social power and the functional utility of intimate 
violence within a society (see Yllo & Bograd, 1988). 
Theoretical Approach of the Present Study 
The present study examines intimate violence from a feminist 
perspective. There are several forms of feminist theory, most of which 
share as a central concern the subordination of women. 3 Each theory 
provides different explanations for this subordination and proposes 
different methods for ending it (Oil en burger & Moore, 1991 ). In her 
discussion of the application of feminist theory to crime, Simpson (1989) 
outlines the three dominant theories - liberal, socialist and radical 
feminism. Liberal feminism views the subordination of women as the 
result of a lack of equal opportunity for women within society. Women 
are disadvantaged by traditional social roles that separate men from 
women and foster discrimination against women who seek to enter the 
"man's world." Liberal feminists assert that the subordination of women 
3 According to Lerner (1986), the term "subordination" is a better description 
of gender relations within a patriarchal society than the commonly used term 
"oppression." Subordination implies a lower relative social position, but also that 
women may submit willingly to an inferior social position to men for purposes of 
survival and gaining advantages within the society, such as male protection. 
Oppression implies "forceful subordination"of women. While this term adequately 
describes the act of beating a woman into submission to male authority, this 
oppression occurs within a social structure of male domination and female 
subordination. Thus, subordination is a broader term that applies to gender 
relations in general and in the context of intimate relationships. 
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can be eliminated by creating opportunities for women within society and 
ending discrimination against them, while breaking down traditional 
gender roles and stereotypes. Differential treatment of intimate violence 
offenders by the criminal justice system is viewed by liberal feminists as a 
result of inequities within the system. Strategies to produce more 
equitable treatment of all offenders, such as sentencing guidelines, are 
seen as important to the removal of discrimination toward intimate 
violence offenders from the criminal justice system. 
Socialist feminism blames the subordination of women on economic 
systems. Capitalism and the ownership of private property have placed 
white men in powerful positions of control over the labor of all women 
and many men. Recreating economic systems and eliminating social 
classes are seen as solutions to gender subordination (Ollenburger & 
Moore, 1991; Simpson, 1989; Messerschmidt, 1986). Socialist feminists 
link the criminal justice system's treatment of intimate violence offenders 
to the lack of economic power of intimate violence victims. If female 
victims of intimate violence were economically empowered by a 
restructuring of existing economic systems, according to socialist 
feminists, the criminal justice system would respond to intimate violence 
off enders differently. 
Radical feminism, like socialist feminism, views a social system, in 
this case, patriarchy, as the main source of the subordination of women. 
Unlike the socialist feminists, radical feminists claim that the 
subordination of women by men was the first and most basic of all forms 
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of human subordination (Ollenburger & Moore, 1991 ). Historically, 
patriarchy, a society structured around male-domination, was produced as 
a result of the biological "disadvantages" of being female, i.e. less 
physical strength and the dependency on others necessitated by pregnancy, 
giving birth and caring for small children. Female biological factors 
allowed men to gain and maintain control. Physical violence was one 
"natural" method for men to control women. Radical feminists cite 
patriarchal social structures as the source of the subordination of women 
and claim that these social structures must be changed, in order to end 
male domination of women in general and intimate violence in particular 
(Ollenburger & Moore, 1991; Simpson, 1989). 
Radical feminist theory is particularly useful in explaining the 
phenomenon of intimate violence because of its explicit focus on male use 
of violence to control women (Martin, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1979). 
Partly as a consequence of the male strength advantage and the forced 
dependence of women on men during the child-bearing years, males used 
violence and/or the threat of violence to gain and maintain control over 
females. The intimate relationship is merely a microcosm of the larger 
society, where men use violence and the threat of violence to subordinate 
and control women in a number of contexts. Within the domestic sphere, 
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individual males have asserted ownership of individual females - their 
wives and daughters. Men are to assure that "their" women do not 
challenge the authority of male rule, both within the home and outside. It 
is within this context that the beating of women by their intimate partners 
takes place. Intimate violence becomes a tool used to terrorize women 
into submission to male authority, both collectively and individually 
(Rich, 1986; Dobash & Dobash, 1979). 
It is generally agreed that criminal justice systems reflect the values 
of the society within which they exists (Anderson & Newman, 1993; 
Friedman, 1993 ). The presence of patriarchal social values is therefore 
likely to affect the response of the criminal justice system to intimate 
violence. While the use of violence against another violates an important 
social norm, patriarchal values may function to discount the seriousness of 
such violations, if the violence is perpetrated by a man against his woman 
(Beasley & Thoman, 1994; Mahoney, 1994; Marcus, 1994; Rapaport, 1994; 
Romany, 1994; Schneider, 1994; Smart, 1989; Klein, 1982; Martin, 1981; 
Dobash & Dobash, 1977/78, 1979; Brownmiller, 1975). 
Until recently intimate violence was generally not considered to be 
crime. Today, mandatory arrest laws and other pro-arrest policies have 
largely ended the exemption of intimate violence from the social 
prohibition against violence. The redefining of intimate violence as crime 
implies that perpetrators of intimate violence deserve punishment. What 
13 
is not clear, however, is whether intimate violence is punished as severely 
as nonintimate violence. The continued existence of patriarchal values 
may mean that intimate violence receives leniency where nonintimate 
violence does not. Therefore, a man who perpetrates violence against his 
woman may be punished less severely than a man who perpetrates violence 
against a man or a woman belonging to another man. 4 Based upon these 
theoretical assertions, the present study sought to determine whether the 
criminal justice system punished men, who were convicted of serious 
assaults against intimates, less severely than men who assaulted 
nonintimates. 5 
The impact of patriarchal values on the severity of punishment of 
intimate assaulters relative to nonintimate assaulters predicted by radical 
feminist theory may be lessened somewhat by Oregon's sentencing 
guidelines. The Oregon legislature, in 1989, voted to implement a set of 
standardized administrative rules for judges to follow when sentencing 
individuals for felony crimes. Standardized rules, or sentencing 
4 This same line of reasoning explains why strangers who rape women receive 
more severe punishment than acquaintances who rape women (Estrich, 1987). 
5 Radical feminist theory regards the dynamics involved in the criminal justice 
response to intimate violence by females against males as qualitatively different 
from the dynamics involved in the response to intimate violence by males against 
females. Gay and lesbian intimate violence also elicits a unique response from the 
criminal justice system (Rich, 1986). While the radical feminist perspective may be 
applied to the criminal justice processing of female-on-male and gay and lesbian 
intimate violence, it is beyond the scope of this study to develop several sets of 
theoretical propositions. 
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guidelines, were seen as necessary because it appeared that unregulated 
judicial discretion often produced wide disparity in the severity of 
sentences given to individuals convicted of similar crimes (Bogan, 1990). 
One of the goals of Oregon's sentencing guidelines was to reduce the 
effects of extralegal factors on sentencing. The Oregon legislature wanted 
to create a set of rules that would produce similar sentences for similar 
crimes and criminals. To that end, the sentencing guidelines were 
implemented and are applicable to all felony crimes committed in the state 
of Oregon on or after November 1, 1989 (OCJC, 1989). 
Despite standardized rules for sentencing offenders, some 
researchers have found that sentencing guidelines may not completely 
remove extralegal factors from sentencing decisions. Sentencing disparity 
based on extralegal factors such as race and socioeconomic status may still 
be present under sentencing guidelines rules (Miller, 1994; OCJC, 1994; 
Oregon Supreme Court Task Force, 1994; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993). 
The use of sentencing guidelines in Oregon may lessen but not eliminate 
the impact of patriarchal values on sentencing in cases of serious intimate 
assault. 
The Research Question 
Do intimate violence offenders subject to sentencing guidelines and 
convicted of serious assaults in Oregon in 1993 receive more lenient 
punishment than nonintimate violence offenders under like circumstances? 
Hypotheses 
The radical feminist perspective regarding the relative severity of 
punishment leads to the following hypotheses: 
1. Intimate violence offenders are more likely than nonintimate violence 
offenders to receive a sentence type of probation rather than prison. 
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2. Intimate violence offenders receive shorter sentences than nonintimate 
violence offenders. 
3. Intimate violence offenders are sentenced to fewer custody units and 
jail days than nonintimate violence offenders. 
4. Eligible intimate violence offenders are more likely than are eligible 
nonintimate violence offenders to be given optional probation, instead of 
pnson. 
5. Intimate violence offenders who used firearms during the commission 
of the assault are less likely than nonintimate violence offenders to receive 
a gun minimum sentence. 
6. When there are departures from presumptive sentences, both downward 
dispositional and downward durational departures are more likely to occur 
in the sentences of intimate violence offenders than in the sentences of 
nonintimate violence offenders. 
7. Downward durational departures result in shorter sentences for intimate 




The population for this study is composed of male offenders who: 
1. were convicted in Oregon of completed or attempted Assault I, II or 
completed Assault III as the major offense, 2. were subject to Oregon's 
sentencing guidelines and 3. had a conviction or sentencing date during 
the calendar year of 1993. There were 4 76 offenders who met these 
criteria identified through the use of the Oregon Department of 
Corrections' automated database, known as the Offender Profile System 
(OPS).6.1 
Data Sources 
The data for this study came from six sources; OPS, Oregon 
Criminal Justice Council's (OCJC) sentencing guidelines database, 
6 One nonintimate violence offender was excluded from the population because 
he was sentenced as a ti dangerous offender. ti This type of offender is defined 
statutorily as suffering from tla severe personality disorder", under ORS. 161.737. 
The length of his sentence was more than eight standard deviations above the mean. 
Six offenders were excluded from the study because their assault convictions came 
as the result of attacks on inmates while they were incarcerated for other crimes. 
Of the offenders with a felony assault as the most serious conviction, during 1993, 
18 were excluded from this study's population because they were not subject to 
sentencing guidelines, due to a crime commission date before November 1, 1989. 
7 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that in 1991 12 percent of the male 
state prisoners serving sentences for assault nationwide had been convicted of 
assaulting an intimate (BJS, 1993). Based upon this finding and the lack of other 
information suggesting that the percent of intimate violence offenders within the 
defined population would be larger, a census rather than a sample was drawn from 
the defined population of offenders in order to ensure that enough intimate violence 
offenders were identified to allow tests of hypotheses. 
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Assault III, ORS 163.185, 163.175, and 163.165. 10 
Dependent Variables: Sentencing Outcomes 
For the purposes of this study, punishment is defined as sentencing 
outcomes. Sentencing outcomes are reflected in type and length of 
sentence and are derived from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. The 
Oregon Criminal Justice Council (OCJC) was created by the Oregon 
legislature for the purpose of developing and monitoring the 
implementation and functioning of the sentencing guidelines. The OCJC 
concluded that the two most relevant pieces of information in the 
determination of sentence severity ought to be 1. the seriousness of the 
crime committed and 2. the offender's criminal history. Seriousness was 
ranked from one to eleven, one being the least serious and eleven being 
the most serious. For example, the crime of bigamy was assigned a 
seriousness ranking of one, because it was perceived to be a relatively 
minor felony. The crime of murder was assigned a seriousness ranking of 
eleven, because it was viewed as a very serious felony. Attempted crimes 
received seriousness rankings two levels below those of completed crimes. 
10 Attempted Assault III is not included here because this crime is statutorily 
defined as a misdemeanor. The narrow focus on felony assault crimes should not 
be understood as denial of the existence of intimate violence in many other forms 
of crime. For example, intimates are robbed, sexually assaulted, burglarized, 
kidnapped, stalked and murdered. Broadening the study to include these other 
types of crimes was not possible in this context, largely because Oregon's crime 
data did not identify intimate violence offenders. Limited resources prevented this 
broader focus. 
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Murder was ranked as an eleven, so attempted murder was ranked as a 
nine. Criminal history was also grouped into categories, based upon the 
offenders' number and type of prior juvenile and adult convictions. The 
categories are alphabetic and range from the least serious, category I, to 
the most serious category A. Prior convictions for crimes against people, 
such as robbery, were considered to be more serious than convictions for 
crimes against property, such as theft (see Appendix A for contents of the 
criminal history categories). 
By placing the values representing crime seriousness on the Y-axis 
and the alphabetical categories representing criminal history on the X-
axis, the OCJC created a sentencing grid. The grid prescribes sentence 
type, i. e. probation or prison, and sentence length for each grid block. 
Individual offenders are sentenced to the type and length of sentence 
specified within the grid block that is at the intersection of each offender's 
criminal history and crime seriousness scores (see Appendix B for the 
sentencing guidelines grid). The resulting sentence is the presumptive 
sentence. Presumptive prison sentences specify length of sentence in a 
range of months. Judges may sentence offenders to a number of months 
within that range. Presumptive sentences of prison also carry 
presumptive terms of post-prison supervision (OCJC, 1989). 11 
11 Parole officers were renamed post-prison supervision officers, but continue 
to supervise those off enders still on parole under the old system. 
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Presumptive probation sentences consist of a pre-determined length 
in months and a maximum number of custody units. Custody units may 
include jail and various other forms of intermediate sanctions, such as 
house arrest and mandatory in-patient drug treatment. For example, grid 
block 6-G prescribes a presumptive sentence of probation and a maximum 
of 180 custody units (see Appendix B for the sentencing guidelines grid). 
This means that the offender may be sentenced to a maximum of 90 days 
in jail. The remaining 90 custody units may be used to sentence the 
offender to other forms of custody, such as in-patient substance abuse 
treatment. Presumptive probation sentences provide only the maximum 
number of custody units and jail days to which judges may sentence 
offenders. Judges have the option of sentencing offenders to no custody 
units or jail days. In other words, presumptive probation sentences may 
result in a specified number of months of probation and nothing more 
(OCJC, 1994). 
The OCJC anticipated that occasionally circumstances of the crime 
or characteristics of the offender would make the presumptive sentence 
prescribed by the guidelines inappropriate. For example, an offender may 
be seen as deserving of a less severe sentence than the one prescribed 
under the guidelines if he or she suffers from a mental illness. In cases 
like these, judges may sentence offenders to a different type of sentence or 
length of sentence, if they cite "substantial and compelling reasons" why 
21 
the presumptive guidelines sentence is not appropriate for a particular 
offender (OCJC, 1989). The "substantial and compelling reasons" under 
the guidelines are called mitigating and aggravating factors. Mitigating 
factors are reasons why particular offenders ought to be given a more 
lenient sentence than the sentence prescribed by the guidelines. 
Aggravating factors are reasons why particular off enders ought to be given 
a more severe sentence than the sentence prescribed by the guidelines (see 
Appendix C for a list of the mitigating and aggravating factors). 
A sentence of a different type or length than the sentence prescribed 
by the guidelines is called a departure. If a judge sentences an offender to 
probation, when the presumptive sentence calls for prison, or gives an 
offender a shorter sentence than the one provided by the guidelines, this is 
called a downward departure. The judge must cite at least one of the nine 
mitigating factors to explain why she or he felt that the departure from the 
guidelines was warranted. If a judge gives a sentences that exceeds the 
presumptive sentence in type of length, this is called an upward departure. 
The judge must then cite at least one of the twelve aggravating factors as 
justification for the departure (OCJC, 1994). 
A few grid blocks within the guidelines prescribe a presumptive 
sentence of prison, but judges have the option of sentencing offenders to 
probation, without departing from the guidelines, if certain conditions are 
met. Offenders within the grid blocks 8-G, 8-H or 8-1, may be sentenced 
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to probation, instead of prison, if they 1. did not use a firearm in the 
commission of their offense, 2. were not under bench or correctional 
supervision at the time of the offense and 3. are able to participate in 
treatment. Offenders who satisfy these conditions are referred to as 
"eligible for optional probation" (OCJC, 1994). 
In order to assist the OCJC in monitoring the functioning of 
sentencing guidelines, Oregon law (ORS 13 7. 0 I 0) requires that all courts 
submit a sentencing guideline worksheet containing sentencing 
information for each felony conviction to various criminal justice 
agencies, including the Department of Corrections and the OCJC. The 
sentencing guidelines worksheets are intended to provide a simplified 
format for judges to use to determine and report individual offender's 
presumptive sentences based on the sentencing grid and to justify 
departures from that grid (see Appendix D for worksheet). The OCJC 
collects these worksheets and enters the information in the existing 
sentencing guidelines database. The OCJC uses the information from this 
database to produce an annual report that summarizes sentencing practices 
in Oregon. 12 
12 When errors are discovered or when worksheets are not filled out 
completely, the OCJC contacts the sentencing court, in order to request correction 
of the error(s) and/or more information. Through this quality control process, the 
OCJC found that ten percent of the reports that it received in 1993 contained some 
type of error, either in calculation of the crime seriousness ranking or the criminal 
history classification, missing data, an improper sentence imposed or guidelines 
departure error. These errors were corrected by the sentencing court in 27 percent 
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In the present study, sentencing outcomes took the form of number 
of custody units, number of jail days, use of gun minimum sentences, use 
of optional probation and type, direction and length of sentencing 
guidelines departure ordered by the sentencing judge as a result of the 
most serious assault conviction. Sentencing outcome variables were coded 
as follows: 
~ of sentence was defined as either prison or probation. 13 
Length of sentence was recorded in months. 
Number of custody units applied only to probationers. 
Number of jail~ applied only to probationers. 
Use_fil gun minimum was recorded if the judge imposed a gun minimum 
sentence as a result of the offender's firearm use during the commission of 
the assault. Oregon law (ORS 161.610) states that offenders who use a 
gun in the commission of an offense shall be given a mandatory sentence 
of 60 months. If the presumptive guidelines sentence is longer than 60 
months, the judge is directed to give the offender the longer presumptive 
sentence. Judges may reduce the length of a gun minimum sentence by 
citing mitigating factors (OCJC, 1994 ). 
of the cases, thus reducing the overall error in the sentencing guidelines worksheets 
entered in the database to approximately eight percent (OCJC, 1994). There is no 
reason to expect that this error is systematic or that it will disproportionately affect 
sentences for the crime of assault. 
13 Probation sentences include those offenders who were sentenced to optional 
probation. 
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Use of optional probation applied only to the sentencing of offenders who 
1. fell into grid blocks 8-G, 8-H and 8-1, 2. were not under correctional 
supervision at the time of the assault, 3. did not use a firearm in the 
commission of the crime and 4. were amenable to treatment. Whether or 
not eligible offenders were sentenced to optional probation, instead of 
prison, was recorded. 
TuM of guidelines departure had two attributes. The first applied to 
dispositional departures, which are sentence types that depart from the 
guidelines, such as probation instead of prison. The second attribute, 
durational departures, referred to sentences of a different length than is 
prescribed by the guidelines. 
Direction of departure reflected whether the imposed sentence was more or 
less severe than the sentence that the guidelines provided. Increased 
severity may mean sentences of greater length or more restrictive 
sentencing type, e.g. number of jail days, number of custody units and/or 
upgraded supervision status from probation to prison. Direction of 
departure was coded as either upward (increased severity of sentence) or 
downward (decreased severity of sentence). 
Length of Durational Departure was measured in one of two ways. In the 
case of an upward durational departure, length of departure was calculated 
by subtracting the maximum presumptive sentence length from the actual 
sentence length. If the departure was downward, length of departure was 
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determined by subtracting the minimum presumptive sentence from the 
ordered sentence. 14 
The following variables were used as controls, i.e. variable besides 
victim-off ender relationship that may affect sentencing outcomes: 
Crime of conviction was either completed or attempted Assault I, II or 
completed Assault III. 
Seriousness ranking of the offense may only vary in completed or 
attempted Assault I convictions, the other assault offenses have been 
preassigned seriousness rankings. 15 Completed Assault I received a 
seriousness ranking of ten, but was reduced to a ranking of nine if the 
"victim(s) substantially contributed to the commission of the offense by 
precipitating attack" (ORS 163 .185). Attempted Assault I receives a 
seriousness ranking of eight, but was reduced to a ranking of seven under 
the same victim precipitation rule (OCJC, 1994 ). 
14 For example, if an offender fells into guidelines grid block 8-D, her or his 
presumptive sentence ranges from 27 to 28 months in prison. If the judge ordered 
an upward durational departure to 30 months, instead of the maximum 28 months, 
the length of the departure would equal two months. If that same offender were 
given a downward durational departure to 25 months, the length of the durational 
departure would be negative two months. 
15 Completed and attempted Assault II convictions and completed Assault III 
convictions are preassigned seriousness rankings. Completed Assault II receives a 
ranking of eight, while both Attempted Assault II and completed Assault III receive 
a seriousness ranking of six. 
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Supervision status at the time of the commission of the assault was of 
three types: I. no supervision, 2. probation, and 3. post-prison/parole. 16 
Offender use of a firearm was recorded if the off ender used a firearm 
during the commission of the assault. 
Criminal history classification, ranging from A to I, was based on prior 
criminal convictions and determined the offenders' location along the X-
axis of the sentencing guidelines grid (see Appendix A). 
Procedures 17 
Sentencing outcome data came largely from the OCJC guidelines 
automated database. The information was coded in the same manner that 
it was coded on the sentencing guidelines worksheet and in the sentencing 
guidelines database. 18 When missing data were encountered within the 
OCJC database, the OPS, offender institution files, offender supervision 
field files, probation officers and institution counselors were consulted to 
acquire the needed information. 
Information on the independent variable, victim-offender 
relationship, was not recorded in the OCJC database. Police reports, 
16 If an offender was under both probation and post-prison/parole supervision at 
the time of the assault, the offender was coded by the more restrictive type of 
supervision, i. e. post-prison/parole. 
17 These procedures were proposed to the Human Subjects Research Review 
Committee which considered them to be exempt from Human Subjects review. 
18 Inter-coder reliability is not discussed in the present study because this 
author personally conducted all data collection and coding. 
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presentence investigation reports, institution counselor narratives, 
supervision chronologies, probation and parole/post-prison supervision 
violation reports, court documents and treatment reports were searched for 
intimate relationship indicators, i. e. the description of the victim as a 
present or former girlfriend or wife. If one or more of these documents 
referred to the victim of the most serious assault as the offender's present 
or former girlfriend or wife, the offender was categorized as an intimate 
violence offender. If the victim was described as anyone other than a 
present or former girlfriend or wife, the offender was categorized as a 
nonintimate violence off ender. 19 
Presentence investigation reports, which offer a detailed description 
of the crime, the circumstances surrounding it, and the victim-offender 
relationship, were sometimes available through the OPS. Victim-offender 
relationship was determined through the use of the OPS in approximately 
20 percent of the cases. In the remaining cases, offender institution files 
and offender supervision field files were reviewed to determine victim-
19 Relying on many different criminal justice actors to define victim-offender 
relationship may be considered problematic in that the definition of terms may not 
be consistent. Inconsistency in the operationalization of the independent variable is 
a threat to the reliability and validity of the study's findings. This threat is reduced 
because of the general social agreement regarding the definition of an intimate 
relationship. The terms girlfriend and wife are generally defined in American 
culture as involving commitment, emotional and sexual intimacy and particular role 
responsibilities (Carlson, 1987). Criminal justice actors, such as police, prosecutors, 
judges and corrections personnel, respond to intimate violence in the context of 
their individual perceptions of the definition of an intimate relationship and what 
rights and responsibilities that intimacy implies (Myers, 1989). 
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offender relationship. 20 When the institution and field files failed to 
provide the necessary information, individual probation and post-prison 
supervision officers and institution counselors were contacted. 21 These 
individuals were able to provide victim-offender relationship information 
by either: 1. their personal knowledge of the specific details of the 
incident and/or victim, 2. contacting district attorneys' offices and 
requesting the information from prosecutorial files, 3. requesting a copy of 
the original police report, or 4. interviewing the offender. 22 
In the event that there was more than one serious assault conviction 
stemming from the same incident, the victim of the most serious assault 
conviction was used to determine victim-offender relationship. For 
example, if an offender were convicted of committing an Assault I against 
20 Offender institution files are created for those off enders who are sentenced 
to prison and are maintained within the particular correctional facility that houses 
the individual offenders. Each offender's institution file may contain all or some of 
the following documents: police reports, presentence investigation report, treatment 
reports, court documents, narrative provided by prison intake counselors, institution 
behavior reports and miscellaneous offender-specific materials, such as victim 
notification requests. For those offenders who receive a sentence of probation for 
their crime, field files are created and maintained within the county of the offender's 
supervision. Field files differ somewhat from institution files in that they contain 
chronologies of the off enders' behavior during the period of correctional 
supervision, and they lack intake counselor narrative and institution behavior 
reports. 
21 Institution counselors and probation and parole/post-prison supervision 
officers were consulted in 58 (10.7%) cases. Victim-offender relationship in six of 
the cases was obtained directly from the files of the Multnomah county district 
attorney's office. 
22 Victim-offender relationship was determined via offender interview in five 
cases. 
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a neighbor and an Assault III against his wife as part of the same violent 
incident, the offender was defined as a non intimate violence offender. 23 
Using the data-collection methods described above, victim-offender 
relationship could not be determined in eight, or .02 percent, of the cases. 
Due to the absence of information on the independent variable, these cases 
were removed from all analyses, thereby reducing the population to 468 
offenders. 
The five categorical measures of sentencing outcomes, type of 
sentence, type of guidelines departure, direction of guidelines departure, 
gun minimum sentence and use of optional probation, were analyzed 
through the use of chi-square tests. 24 The continuous measures of 
sentencing outcome, length of sentence, length of duration departure, 
number of custody units and the number of jail days, were analyzed 
through the use of !-tests for independent samples and multiple linear 
23 This situation very rarely arose among the defined population. In the event 
that an off ender was convicted of two counts of the same type of serious assault, 
such as Assault II, the victim of the first count determined victim-offender 
relationship. For example, if an offender were convicted of two counts of 
Attempted Assault I and the victim listed in the first count was the ex-girlfriend of 
the assailant, that individual would have been recorded as an intimate violence 
offender. If, however, the victim listed in the first count were a nonintimate, the 
offender would have been counted as a nonintimate violence offender. No 
offenders were found to have been convicted of two counts of the same type of 
serious assault with both an intimate and a nonintimate listed as the victims, in any 
order. 
24 While these are not analytically ideal levels of measurement, categorical 
data have been recognized as one typical feature of criminal case-processing 
research (Straus, 1993 ). 
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regression. For purposes of regression analyses, several categorical 
variables were collapsed into dichotomous variables and included some 
measures of offender demographics (see Appendix E). 25 
25 Offender demographics, such as age, race and jurisdiction, may affect case 
processing (Miller, 1994; Oregon Criminal Justice Council, 1994; D'Alessio & 
Stolzenbery, 1993; Crank, 1992; Albonetti, 1991; Chen, 1991; Erez & Tontodonata, 
1990; Mohr, 1990; Spohn, 1990; Schmidt & Steury, 1989; Casper, 1988; Daly, 
1987; Langan, 1985). Within several of the regression models, variables were 
included to control for the affects of offender demographics, such as race and 
county of conviction. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
Seventy (15%) of the 468 offenders were intimate violence 
offenders, while 398 (85%) were nonintimate violence offenders. The 
average age of the intimate violence offenders was 31.5 years and of the 
non intimate violence offenders was 28. 0 years. This difference in average 
age was statistically significant! (466)=2.85, n_<.05. The majority of 
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders were white. Thirty-nine 
(5 5. 7%) intimate violence offenders and 281 (70. 6%) nonintimate violence 
offenders were white. Most of the nonwhite intimate violence offenders 
were African American, accounting for 3 0 percent of all intimate violence 




Racial Distribution of Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders 
Intimate Nonintimate 
Race N = 70 N = 398 
White 39 281 
55.7% 70.6% 
African 21 52 




Native 0 10 




Of intimate violence offenders, 41 (58.6%) were convicted of either 
Assault III or Attempted Assault II and 229 (57.5%) nonintimate violence 
offenders were convicted of one of these crimes. Twenty-nine intimate 
violence offenders (41.4%) were convicted of one of the more legally 
serious forms of assault, Assault I, II or Attempted Assault I. One 
hundred sixty-nine (42.5%) nonintimate violence offenders were convicted 
of one of these more serious forms of assault (see Table 2). There is a 
significant difference among the type of assault conviction of intimate and 
nonintimate violence offenders x2 (9, N=468}=38.0661, n<.05. The 
greatest difference appears to be in an under-representation of intimate 
violence offenders in the Assault III category and an over-representation 
of the same in the Attempted Assault II category. Of the seven intimate 
violence offenders convicted of Assault I and Attempted Assault I, three 
were seen by the judge or jury as having been provoked by a victim who 
"substantially precipitated" in the assault, as evidenced by the reduced 
seriousness ranking of the crime. Of the 53 nonintimate violence 
offenders convicted of the same crimes, 22 ( 42%) were seen as similarly 
provoked by the assault victim. 
Table--1 
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders By Most Serious 
Crime of Conviction 
Intimate Nonintimate 
Crime N = 70 N = 398 
Completed 17 192 
Assault III 24.3% 48.2% 
Attempted 24 37 
Assault II 34.3% 9.3% 
Completed 22 110 
Assault II 31.4% 27.6% 
Attempted 3 26 
Assault I 4.3% 5.6% 
Completed 4 36 
Assault I 5.7% 9.0% 
About sixty-seven percent of intimate violence offenders and 66.6 
percent of nonintimate violence offenders, were grouped within the three 
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least extensive criminal history categories, I, H and G (see Appendix F for 
a table of the criminal history categories of intimate and nonintimate 
violence offenders). About 30 percent of all offenders were under some 
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form of correctional supervision at the time the assault was committed. 
Sixteen (22.9%) intimate violence offenders were on probation at the time 
of the assault and six (8.6%) were on parole or post-prison supervision. 
Eighty-six (21.6%) nonintimate violence offenders were on probation at 
the time of the assault, while 33 (8.3%) were on parole or post-prison 
supervision. 26 
Hypotheses Tests 
~ of Sentence 
Nearly identical percentages of intimate and nonintimate violence 
offenders were sentenced to probation and prison. Of intimate violence 
offenders, 43 (61.4%) were sentenced to probation, while 246 (61.8%) 
nonintimate violence offenders were sentenced to probation. Similarly, 27 
(3 8.6%) intimate violence offenders were sentenced to prison and 152 
(3 8.2%) nonintimate violence offenders were sentenced to prison (see 
Table 4). Overall, 15 percent of the offenders sentenced to prison were 
intimate violence offenders. This represents a slightly larger percentage 
of intimate violence off enders among those sentenced to prison for felony 
assault than the 12 percent found by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1993) 
in its survey of male state prisoners. Of the 43 intimate violence 
offenders sentenced to probation, 15 (34. 9%) had a presumptive sentence 
26 In the cases of two nonintimate violence off enders, supervision status at the 
time of the assault could not be determined. 
under the sentencing guidelines of prison. Of the 246 nonintimate 
violence offenders sentenced to probation, 66 (26.8%) had a presumptive 
sentence of prison. One intimate violence offender and four non intimate 
violence offenders had a presumptive sentence of probation, but were 
sentenced to prison (see Table 3 ). 27 
Table_]_ 
Intimate and Nonintimate By Sentence Type Given 
and Presumptive Sentence Type* 
Intimate Nonintimate 
Type of Sentence N = 70 N = 398 
Given Presumptive 28 180 
Probation 40.0% 45.2% 
Given Non- 15 66 
Presumptive Probation 21.4% 16.6% 
Given Presumptive 26 148 
Prison 37.1% 37.2% 
Given Non- I 4 
Presumptive Prison - -
• Columns do not add to 100% due to rounding 
Length of Sentence 
Length of sentence was examined by type of sentence, because 
probation and prison sentences are qualitatively different types of 
sentences. For those intimate violence offenders sentenced to probation, 
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27 A chi-square test could not be preformed on the differences in presumptive 
and given sentence type for intimate and nonintimate violence offenders due to the 
small numbers of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders in some cells. 
the average length of sentence was 3 5 .4 months. The average length of 
sentence for nonintimate violence offenders sentenced to probation was 
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37.0 months. This difference in means is statistically significant t (287)= 
-2. 76, 12<.05 (see Table 4). Length of probation sentence was regressed on 
a number of independent variables thought to be predictive of probation 
length; presumptive probation length, criminal history, guidelines 
departure, presumptive sentence type, type of crime, victim-offender 
relationship and supervision status. Victim-offender relationship was not 
significant when these other variables were taken into account. Variables 
found to significantly predict length of probation sentence were 
presumptive probation length and supervision status (see Appendix G). 
Intimate violence off enders who were sentenced to prison received a 
mean sentence of 23 .1 months and nonintimate violence off enders 
sentenced to prison received an average of 31 months. This difference in 
sentence length was not significant. Length of prison sentence was 
regressed on several variables; presumptive sentence type, minimum 
presumptive sentence length, type of crime, criminal history, victim-
offender relationship and supervision status. Of these variables, the only 
one found to significantly predict length of prison sentence was minimum 
presumptive sentence length (see Appendix G). 
Table3 
Type and Length of Sentence of Intimate 
and Nonintimate Violence Offenders 
Intimate Nonintimate 
Variable N = 70 N = 398 
Sentence Tyne 
Probation 43 (61.4%) 246 (61.8%) 
Prison 27 (38.6%) 152 {38.2%) 
Average 
Sentence Length 
Probation 35.4 months 37.0 months 
Prison 23.1 months 31.0 months 
Number of Custody Units and Jail Days 
The mean number of custody units given to intimate violence 
offenders as a part of their probation sentences was 115 and to 
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nonintimate violence offenders was 124. This difference in means was not 
statistically significant. Custody units were regressed on a number of 
variables; criminal history, type of crime, supervision status, guidelines 
departure, presumptive sentence type, county of conviction, victim-
offender relationship and racial minority. The variable that was found to 
be significant in predicting number of custody units offenders were 
sentenced to was the county of conviction (see Appendix H). 28 
Intimate violence offenders were sentenced to an average of 44 
28 Multnomah county sentenced probationers to an average of 108, while the 
other Oregon counties, in toto, sentenced probationers to an average of 132 custody 
units. This difference in means is statistically significant t (242) = -2.67, 12 <.05. 
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days in jail, while non intimate violence offenders were sentenced to an 
average of 45 days. This difference is not statistically significant. One 
intimate violence offender was sentenced to serve 3 60 days in jail as part 
of his probation sentence, twice the number of jail days given to any other 
offender. 29 Removing this offender from the group resulted in a reduction 
of the average number of jail days from 43 to 36 days. The removal of 
this extreme case does not produce a significant difference between the 
average number of jail days given to intimate and nonintimate violence 
offenders. Number of jail days was regressed on several independent 
variables; criminal history, type of crime, supervision status, guidelines 
departure, length of probation sentence, county of conviction, victim-
offender relationship and number of custody units. The variables that 
were found to be significant in predicting length of jail sentence were type 
of crime, county of conviction, length of probation and number of custody 
units. Jo 
29 No explanation was offered as to why such a lengthy departure was justified. 
30 It is not surprising that the number of custody units given is predictive of 
the length of jail sentences. Judges frequently sentenced offenders to the same 
number of custody units and jail days. As with custody units, Multnomah county 
sentenced probationers to significantly fewer jail days, with an average of 33 days, 
compared to an average jail sentence of 54 days from the other Oregon counties t 
(289) = 3.56, J2<.05. Those probationers convicted of Assault III and Attempted 
Assault II were sentenced to serve an average of 41 days in jail, while those 
convicted of the more legally serious assault crimes were sentenced to serve an 
average of 58 days in jail ! (88) = 1.96, n =.05. 
39 
Use of Optional Probation 
Of the 13 eligible intimate violence offenders, ten (76. 9%) were 
granted optional probation. 31 Of the 49 nonintimate violence offenders 
eligible, 3 7 (75. 5%) were granted optional probation. 32 All three of the 
intimate violence offenders who were denied optional probation were 
given the maximum presumptive prison sentence. In none of the cases, did 
the sentencing judge record a reason why optional probation was not 
granted. The small number of intimate violence offenders prohibited 
statistical comparisons of judicial discretion in the granting of optional 
probation to intimate and nonintimate violence offenders. 
Gun Minimum Sentence 
Firearms were used by eight ( 12. 9%) intimate violence offenders 
and 39 (9.8%) nonintimate violence offenders. Two of these intimate 
violence offenders and eight of these nonintimate violence offenders were 
given gun minimum sentences. The number of off enders is too small to 
allow comparisons of judicial discretion in the use of gun minimum 
31 Three intimate violence off enders were within the proper grid blocks for 
optional probation, 8-1, 8-H and 8-1, but were ineligible to receive it. One intimate 
violence offender was ineligible because of his supervision status at the time of the 
commission of the assault. Two were ineligible for optional probation because of 
the use of a firearm during the assault. 
32 Eight nonintimate violence off enders who were ineligible for optional 
probation were, nonetheless, given probation sentences. Seven of them were given 
probation as a downward dispositional departure. The judge granted optional 
probation to the eighth, even though he was ineligible, due to his supervision status 
at the time of the assault. 
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sentences between intimate and nonintimate violence off enders. 33 
The fact that 48 offenders used firearms and only I 0 gun minimum 
sentences were given is surprising because Oregon law (ORS 161.610) 
mandates such a sentence in these cases. While the law provides the 
option of departure from the length of the gun minimum sentence, it does 
not allow discretion in its use. 34 
Direction and Type of Sentencing Guidelines Departure 
Thirteen (18.6%) intimate violence offenders were given sentences 
that departed from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. Eighty-nine (22.4%) 
nonintimate violence offenders were given sentences that departed from 
33 Both of the intimate violence offenders given a gun minimum sentence were 
convicted of Assault I. One of these offenders was sentenced to 5 5 months in 
prison, a departure from the 60 month gun minimum. He was on probation at the 
time of the commission of the assault. Of the seven intimate violence offenders 
who were not given gun minimum sentences, four were convicted of Assault II. 
One of them was convicted of Attempted Assault I, another of Attempted Assault II 
and the remaining off ender for Assault III. Three were on supervision status. 
Three were sentenced to probation. One of these probationers was given a 
downward dispositional departure, as if it were the presumptive sentence type, 
despite the fact that the offender was under post-prison supervision at the time of 
the commission of the assault. 
34 In several cases in which a victim was shot by the offender, the gun was not 
considered during the process of conviction and sentencing. For example, one 
offender committed a drive-by shooting at the home of a rival gang member. He 
was arrested for Attempted Assault I With A Firearm and additional charges, 
including Ex-Felon in Possession of A Firearm. The sentencing order read that he 
had plead guilty to the charge of Attempted Assault I. The order stated that the 
charge of Ex-Felon in Possession of A Firearm was dismissed, as was the phrase 
"With A Firearm," formerly part of the Attempted Assault I charge. This offender 
was not given a gun minimum sentence, in fact, the sentencing guidelines 
worksheet submitted to the OCJC stated that a gun was not involved. 
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the sentencing guidelines. One (1.4%) intimate violence offender was 
given an upward departure sentence and 28 (7%) nonintimate violence 
offenders were given an upward departure sentence. Downward departures 
were given to 12 (17.1%} intimate violence offenders and to 63 (15.8%) 
nonintimate violence offenders (see Table 5). The small number of 
departures did not permit statistical analyses. 
Durational departure sentences were given to 65 (13.9%) offenders, 
overall. Eight intimate violence offenders were given sentences that were 
durational departures. One (1.4%) intimate violence offender was given 
an upward durational departure sentence and seven ( 10%) were given 
sentences that were downward durational departures. 35 The non intimate 
35 The intimate violence offender who received an upward durational departure 
was a white 43-year-old male who assaulted his girlfriend. He was convicted of 
Assault II, had a criminal history category of D, and was on probation at the time 
of the assault. The court increased his presumptive prison sentence by 10 months, 
ordered him to complete alcohol and drug treatment and to undergo a mental health 
evaluation. Aggravating factors cited by the judge were; deliberate cruelty to 
victim, persistent similar offenses and other factors. 
Six of the seven intimate violence offenders who were given downward 
durational departure were convicted and sentenced in Multnomah county. One was 
convicted of Assault m, three of Attempted Assault II, one of Assault II, one of 
Attempted Assault I and one was convicted of Assault I. Four of the intimate 
violence offenders were under correctional supervision at the time of the 
commission of the assault. Two of the offenders were white, four were African 
American and one was Hispanic. The mitigating factors cited were; defendant's 
mental capacity, other factors and offense accomplished by another. The latter 
factor was cited in the sentencing order of an offender who captured and restrained 
his former girlfriend, so that his current girlfriend could assault her. No mitigating 
factors were cited in the sentencing of two of the intimate violence offenders. The 
departure sentences were given as if the abbreviated length were the offenders' 
presumptive sentences. 
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violence offenders given departure sentences were more equally split 
between upward and downward durational departures. Twenty-eight (7%) 
nonintimate violence offenders received upward durational departures and 
29 (7.3%) received downward durational departures (see Table 5). 
Dispositional departures were given to 44 (9.4%) offenders, overall. 
Five (7.1 %) intimate violence offenders received dispositional departures 
and all of these were downward from prison to probation. 36 Of the 
nonintimate violence offenders, three (0. 8%) received upward departures 
from probation to prison and 3 6 (9%) received downward departures from 
prison to probation (see Table 5). The small number of intimate violence 
offenders given dispositional and durational departures prohibits statistical 
analyses of group differences. 
36 All five of the intimate violence off enders who were given probation, instead 
of prison, were convicted of assaulting their present or former girlfriends. The 
mitigating factors cited to justify these dispositional departures were; defendant's 
cooperation with the state, conviction free for a significant period of time and other 
factors. One off ender, whose presumptive sentence was 41 to 45 months in prison, 
was sentenced to 36 months probation, drug treatment and no days in jail. His 
criminal history category was A and he was convicted of Assault II. The mitigating 
factor cited to justify the departure was "other factors." Another offender sentenced 
in Multnomah county, was under post-prison supervision at the time of the assault. 
He was convicted of Attempted Assault II and was sentenced to 36 months 
probation, instead of 10 to 12 months in prison. Although a gun was involved in 
the assault, no gun minimum sentence was given and the offender was not 
sentenced to any jail time or any number of custody units. No mitigating factors 
were cited. The judge gave this sentence as if it were derived from Oregon's 
sentencing guidelines. 
Table-2 
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders 
By Direction and Type of Guidelines Departure 
Intimate Nonintimate 
Departure N = 70 N = 398 
Upward Durational I (7%) 28 (29%) 
Downward Durational 7 (54%) 29 (30%) 
Upward Dispositional - 3 (3%) 
Downward Dispositional 5 (39%) 36 (38%) 
Length of Durational Departures 
Because only one intimate violence offender received an upward 
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durational departure, the average length of upward duration departures of 
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders can not be meaningful 
compared. 37 The average length of downward durational departure for 
intimate violence offenders sentenced to prison was 8.2 months shorter 
than the guidelines presumptive sentence. The average downward 
durational departure for nonintimate violence offenders sentenced to 
prison was 7. 8 months shorter than the guidelines' sentence. 
Since only one intimate violence offender who received a downward 
durational departure was sentenced to probation, the length of durational 
departure for intimate and nonintimate violence off enders sentenced to 
37 The intimate violence offender received a sentence of I 0 months longer than 
the sentence prescribed by the guidelines. 
probation was not compared. 38 
38 The intimate violence off ender was sentenced to 24 months of probation, 
which was a downward durational departure of 12 months. The judge gave this 




Summary of Results 
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that intimate 
violence offenders convicted of serious assaults receive more lenient 
punishment than nonintimate violence offenders. Data were used to 
evaluate seven research hypotheses. Below, each hypothesis is listed 
followed by a discussion of findings. 
1. Intimate violence offenders are more likely than nonintimate violence 
offenders to receive a sentence~ of probation. 
The data revealed that a nearly identical proportion of intimate and 
nonintimate violence off enders were sentenced to probation. This finding 
of no difference lends no support to the research hypothesis. However, 
when presumptive sentence type was taken into account, proportionately 
more intimate violence offenders with a presumptive sentence of prison 
were given probation than nonintimate violence off enders. This 
supporting evidence must be considered anecdotal because statistical tests 
could not be performed due to an inadequate number of offenders in two 
of the categories of comparison. 
2. Intimate violence offenders receive shorter sentences than nonintimate 
violence offenders. 
This hypothesis, if taken at face value, found support among those 
off enders sentenced to probation, but not among those sentenced to prison. 
Intimate violence offenders sentenced to probation were, indeed, given 
shorter sentences than nonintimate violence off enders. The regression 
analyses of probation length showed when other factors were taken into 
account, victim-offender relationship did not significantly influence 
sentence length. The average prison sentence of intimate violence 
offenders was shorter than nonintimate violence off enders but this 
difference was not statistically significant. These findings do not lend 
support to the assertion that intimate violence offenders receive shorter 
sentences than nonintimate violence offenders. 
3. Intimate violence off enders are sentenced to fewer custody uni ts and 
jail days than nonintimate violence offenders. 
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. While intimate 
violence offenders sentenced to probation were given, on average, fewer 
custody units and jail days than nonintimate violence offenders, this 
difference was not statistically significant. 
4. Eligible intimate violence offenders are more likely than eligible 
nonintimate violence offenders to be given optional probation. instead of 
pnson. 
Intimate and nonintimate violence off enders were granted optional 
probation in similar proportions thus lending no support to the research 
hypothesis. 
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5. Intimate violence offenders who used firearms during the commission 
of the assault are less likely than nonintimate violence offenders to receive 
~_gyn minimum sentence. 
The numbers of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders who 
used firearms and received gun minimum sentences were too small to 
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address this hypothesis. 
6. When there are departures from presumptive sentences. both downward 
dispositional and downward durational departures are more likely in the 
sentencing of intimate violence offenders than in the sentencing of 
nonintimate violence offenders. 
The number of intimate violence offenders who received guidelines 
departures of any kind was very small, disallowing comparisons of the 
type and direction of sentencing guidelines departures. 
7. Downward durational departures result in shorter sentences for intimate 
violence offenders than nonintimate violence offenders. 
While the downward durational departures did result in shorter 
average prison sentences for intimate violence offenders than nonintimate 
violence offenders, this finding cannot support the above hypothesis 
because it is based on very few cases. 
One of the main findings of this study is that, in felony assault 
cases, sentencing decisions are more likely to reflect the provisions of 
Oregon's sentencing guidelines than judges' views of the victim-offender 
relationship. In other words, sentencing guidelines and not victim-
offender relationship dictate the type and duration of punishment for 
felony assaults in Oregon. Once intimate violence offenders are convicted 
of felony assault, they do not appear to receive more lenient punishment 
than nonintimate violence offenders. It is possible that Oregon's 
sentencing guidelines counteracted the influence of patriarchal values in 
the sentencing of intimate violence offenders. Despite the guidelines' 
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possible effect on victim-offender relationship, there was evidence that 
other extralegal factors, i. e. supervision status and county of conviction, 
had some influence on sentencing. These results support other findings 
that extralegal factors may not be completely ruled out under sentencing 
guidelines (Miller, 1994; OCJC, 1994; Oregon Supreme Court Task Force, 
1994; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993). 
Since the present study did not find evidence that victim-offender 
relationship was among the extralegal factors influencing sentencing 
outcomes, this finding may lend support to the conclusion that patriarchal 
values do not exist within the sentencing phase of the Oregon criminal 
justice process. However, it is also possible that effects of patriarchal 
values are merely minimized by the decision rules set forth under the 
guidelines. In order to determine the specific effects of sentencing 
guidelines, a similar study could be undertaken that would compare the 
sentencing outcomes of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders in 
jurisdictions with and without sentencing guidelines. If intimate violence 
offenders are punished more leniently in jurisdictions without guidelines 
and equally or less leniently in jurisdictions with guidelines, this finding 
would lend support to the hypothesis that the presence of guidelines 
mitigates the influence of patriarchal values on the severity of punishment. 
It is also possible that the recently increased concern over violence in the 
United States has made intimate violence a high priority crime, a concern 
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that may reduce the influence of victim-offender relationship in sentencing 
decisions. 
Previous research has shown that leniency toward intimate violence 
offenders may be shown at other phases of the criminal justice system 
(Cohen, 1994; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Hart, 1993; Ford, 1991; McGuire, 
1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Gondolf & McFerron, 1989; Erez, 
1986; Langan & Innes, 1986; Lerman, 1986; Ellis, 1984; Worden & 
Pollitz, 1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko, 1982; Davis & Smith, 1981; Brosi, 
1979; Do bash & Do bash, 1979). Police and prosecutors often decide the 
fate of offenders before any judicial proceedings take place. When police 
officers do not arrest and prosecutors do not charge intimate violence 
offenders for reasons other than lack of evidence, these offenders escape 
without punishment. Intimate violence offenders who are offered a plea 
bargain that downgrades a serious assault to a misdemeanor or an 
attempted murder to an Assault III, are afforded leniency before their 
cases ever reach the sentencing phase of the criminal justice process and, 
therefore, before sentencing guidelines come into play. 
In support of other research findings (Hart, 1993; Ford, 1991; 
McGuire, 1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Lerman, 1986; Ellis, 
1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko, 1982; Brosi, 1979), the present study found 
some evidence of possible prosecutorial downgrading of charges in 
intimate violence cases. Significantly more intimate than nonintimate 
violence offenders were found among those convicted of the attempted 
assault crimes. Attempted assaults are given seriousness rankings two 
levels below the rankings of the completed crimes. In some cases, when 
intimate violence offender were convicted of an attempted assault, it was 
not that the assault had not been completed. Police reports stated that 
victim interviews were conducted after the victim received medical 
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treatment at a hospital. These victims had been shot, stabbed, physically 
beaten and run over with vehicles. In one case, a man stabbed his ex-wife 
with a knife. She ran from the house, bleeding, while the offender chased 
her with the knife. The man was arrested on a variety of charges, 
including attempted murder. He was convicted of Attempted Assault II, 
via a plea bargain, for attempting to stab her with the knife with which he 
had already stabbed her. Instead of spending the presumptive 21 to 22 
months in prison for completed Assault II, he received a presumptive 
sentence of 36 months probation. 
Given the findings of this study, it might be advisable to retest the 
theoretical hypothesis using data from those component of the criminal 
justice process that are afforded more discretion than the courts under 
sentencing guidelines. Police departments and prosecutor's offices with no 
or very limited policies regarding the handling of intimate violence cases 
may treat intimate violence offenders with more leniency than departments 
and offices that limit the use of discretion. Arrest and investigation 
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practices of police in intimate violence cases compared to nonintimate 
violence cases may be examined, as well as prosecutorial charging and 
plea bargain decision-making. Do prosecutors offer more lenient "deals" 
to intimate violence offenders than to nonintimate violence offenders? For 
example, in some cases, intimate violence offender became nonintimate 
violence offenders during the plea bargaining process. One such instance 
involved an offender who attempted to stab his ex-girlfriend. When a 
male passerby came to the aid of the woman, the assailant attempted to 
stab him, as well. The off ender was arrested for the attempted assault of 
both people. In exchange for a guilty plea, the prosecutor dropped all 
charges in connection with the attempted assault of the woman. Since 
prosecutors are more free from public scrutiny than police, more lenient 
treatment of intimate violence offenders may be found within the 
prosecutorial arena. 
Limitations 
The findings of this study are not applicable to intimate violence 
offenders who were convicted of any crime other than completed or 
attempted Assault I, II and III as the major offense or who are exempted 
from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. Excluding those offenders with 
convictions for more serious crimes than assault created a more 
homogeneous population, but this exclusion also disqualified some 
intimate violence cases. For example, one intimate violence case involved 
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a man who broke down the door to the home of his ex-girlfriend (his 
former residence) and proceeded to assault her. On his way out, he took 
the television. When the case was decided, the man was convicted of 
Assault III and Burglary I, for the theft of the television from an occupied 
dwelling. Presumably, the man's primary motivation for going to the 
home was not to take the television, but to assault his former partner. 
This case had to be excluded from consideration because Burglary I has a 
seriousness rank of nine and Assault III has a ranking of six. The 
inclusion of cases with any felony assault conviction, regardless of 
seriousness ranking, may have produced a different picture of sentencing 
of intimate violence cases. 39 
Analyses were limited by the relatively small number of intimate 
violence offenders among convicted assaulters. About half of the 
theoretical predictions could not be tested due to the lack of sufficient 
data on intimate violence offenders. Future studies of intimate violence 
offenders among felony populations should cast a wider net, perhaps by 
reviewing more than one year of felony assault cases. The present study 
did not record the gender of the victim in nonintimate violence cases and, 
therefore, the impact of victim gender on the findings is unknown. 
39 Including those offenders with any felony assault conviction would have 
also allowed the examination of the hypothesis that, in the majority of convictions 
for intimate violence assaults, the assault was not the most legally serious crime of 
conviction. It might be that criminal justice actors view the theft of property, for 
example, as more serious than the beating of an intimate partner. 
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The difficulty in obtaining victim-offender relationship information 
prevented the determination of victim-offender relationship in prior 
criminal convictions, lesser offenses, previous arrests and the original 
arrest charges. This clearly limits understanding of the criminal justice 
processing of intimate violence cases. Criminal history information for 
example, cannot be used to infer other convictions for intimate violence 
because victim-offender relationship could only be determined for the 
1993 felony assault conviction. Likewise, convictions for lesser offenses 
at the same time as the 1993 assault conviction could not be assumed to 
have involved the same victim. 40 No information is provided regarding 
previous arrests or the nature of the charges brought against the off ender 
at the time of the arrest that lead to the 1993 felony assault conviction. 
Because of the lack of arrest information and the limited nature of the 
prosecution data, this study cannot provide a complete picture of the 
criminal justice processing of intimate violence in the state of Oregon. 
40 Only a few cases were identified that involved a nonintimate listed as the 
victim of the most serious assault and an intimate listed a the victim of a less 
serious offense. It seemed that in most of the intimate violence cases, either the 
intimate was viewed as the primary victim of the violent incident, or not treated as 
a victim at all. For example, a woman and her husband lived in the apartment 
above her sister and her sister's boyfriend. One evening, the woman heard sounds 
of a struggle and her sister screaming. The woman's husband ran downstairs to 
rescue his sister-in-law from an assault. When he arrived, the man observed his 
sister-in-law being kicked by her boyfriend. The brother-in-law was then attacked 
by the boyfriend, who brutally beat the rescuer as well. As the result of a plea 
bargain, the assailant was convicted for the assault of the brother-in-law and not his 
girlfriend, despite the severe injuries caused to the woman. 
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APPENDIX A 
Criminal History Categories 
OAR 253-04-007 CRIM1NAL HISTORY CATEGORIES. The criminal history categories in the 













Descriotive Criminal Historv 
The . offender's criminal history includes three or more person felonies in any 
combination of adult convictions or juvenile adjudications. 
The offender's criminal history includes two person felonies in any combination of 
adult convictions or juvenile adjudications. 
The offender's criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication 
for a person .felony; and one or more adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for 
a non-person Felony. 
The offender's criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication 
for a person felony; but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudications for a non-
person felony. 
The offender's criminal history includes four or more adult convictions for. non-
person felonies but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person. felony. 
The· offender's criminal history includes two or three adult convictions for non-
person felonies but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person feioo.r. 
The offender's crimin~l history includes four or more adult convictions for aa.Ss 
A misdemeanors: one adult conviction for a non-person felony; or three or more 
juvenile adjudications for non-person felonies, but no adult conviction or juvenile 
adjudication for a person felony. · 
The offender's criminal history includes no adult felony conviction or juvenile 
adjudication for a person felony; no more than two juvenile adjudications for non-
person felonies; and no more than three adult convictions for Class A misdemeanors. 
The offender's criminal history docs not include any juvenile adjudication for a 
felony or any adult conviction for a felony or aass A misdemeanor. 
OAR 253-04-008 PERSON CUSS A ADULT MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS. Every two 
prior adult convictions of person Oass A misdemeanors in the offender's criminal history shall be 
counted as one adult .conviction of a person felony for criminal history purposes. 
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APPENDIX C 
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors 
Mitigating and aggravating factors are cited as the statutorily relevant 
reasons for presumptive sentence departures. Each factor is assigned a 
letter and a judge may cite more than one factor. 
Mitigating Factors 
A. Victim involvement 
B. Defendant under duress, 
C. Defendant's mental capacity 
D. Offense accomplished by another 
E. Defendant's minor role 
F. Defendant's cooperation with the state 
G. Harm or loss less than typical 
H. Conviction free for a significant period 
I. Other 
Aggravating Factors 
A. Deliberate cruelty to victim 
B. Victim particularly vulnerable 
C. Violence toward victim or witness 
D. Persistent involvement in similar offenses 
E. Weapon use 
F. Violation of public trust 
G. Multiple victims or incidents 
H. Crime part of organized operation 
I. Permanent injury to person 
J. Harm/loss greater than typical 
K. Motivated by race, religion or sexual orientation of the victim 
L. Other 
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·PLEASE PRESS FIRMLY 
1 Court Ca•• I 
APPENDIX D 
Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet 
PART A 
2 OHender'a Laat Nam• First Ml 3 Sex I 4 Birthdat• 
10 Male 
zOFemale 
5 County of Sentencing 6 Rae• 
10Wh11e 
20 Black 
7 SID f 8 Date Found Cuilty 





10 Supervision Status At Otf•na• 
10Ptea w/charges(s) dropped 
2 0 Plea to leuer included 
30Ptea to original enarge(s) 
4 0 Slipulated Facts 
50 Beneh TnaJ 
10 None 
20 Probalion 
3 0 Posr-Prison/Parote 
60 Jury Trial 
4 0 Incarceration/Escape 
11 Did The Ca•• Involve 
1 0 No stipulations 
2 0 Stipulated grid block only 
3 0 Stipulated grid block and presumptive sentence 
4 0 Stipulated grid block and depanure sen1ence 
12 Most Serious Offense (Pnmary Offense) 13 ORS 
Anempt or SolicitaDon 20 Conspiracy 160 Firearm Uaed 
18 ORS 
or Solicitation 2 0 Consoiracy 210 Firearm Used 
23 ORS 












Record all prior felony and A-misdemeanor convictions on Criminal History Worksh .. t and attach. ...iij 
29 The presumptive guideline sentence tor the primary offense is: 
1 0 A prison •nn of ID monins and 2 0 A probationary sentence 
a post-prison suoervision 1erm of months. of months. 
30 Adcitional current convictions: PRESUMPTIVE RANCE BASE RANCE 
Second most serious 10 monltls _____ ID months 









SUBMIT PROMPTLY To·: 
OREGON CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL 
P.O. Box 751, Portland State University 
Portland. Oreqon 97207 
•PL.EASE PRESS FIRMLY PART B 
31 Court Ca•• ' 32 Offender'• Laat Mame Fl rat Ml I 33 Sentencing D•t• I 34 PSI Ol"IMred 
1 0Yes 2 0No 
{). SENTENCE DISPOSITION ~ 
r ----- ·-- ~ r PROBATION PRISON 
.... 
10Bench 43 Moat Serious Offena•(Prlmary): ----months 
35 P-robatJon Length: ___ "'°"th• 20 Supetvised I I 
44 Second Moat Serious:---- months 
IMPOSITION OF: 1 0 Conc:umtnt 20 Consecutive 
ID primary sentence 
CUSTODY JAIL 
UNITS 45 · ThJrd Moat Serious: ____ months 
36 Moat Serious Ott.nae --- ___ uya 1 O Concurntnt 2 0 Consecutive 
ID pnmary sentence 
37 2nd Moat Serious Offense ___ ___ daya '6 Total Term of Imprisonment: ____ months 
38 3rd Moat Serious Offense --- ___ uya 47 Thia prison t•nn runs: 1 0 Concurrendy 
39 Total ___ d•ys 20 Consea.i!Nely 
to prior -ntenc• ln ea.a I 
40 Total Fln11nclal Conditions s 
48 Poat-prt-n Supervision : ----month&. 
41 Typ. of TNabnent or Evaluation: 
<49 Cun Minimum lmpo-d: 10Yes 
0 Drug 0AJcohol 0 Mental Health 0 Sex Offender 0 Other Sentence Pursuant to ORS 137.635: t0Yes 
[ FOR OFFENDERS IN 8-G, 8-H OR 8-1 ~ 
10Yes 
42 Eligible for Optional Probation 20 No 
If ineligible, cite raason(s): 10 Trea1ment not available 
2(] Firaann use 
.. 
50 A departll1'9 -nt•nc• waa 
bnposed for the: 
10 Mo&t Serious Ollense 
20 2"d Moci S-OUS Ollilnse 
30 :ltd Moel Serious oi-
51 Typ• of departure -nt•nce: 
100i-U-.1 
2 0 Ou,.lional 
3 0 Oi~llioMI Md OulalioNI 
• 0 Dangerous Ollenoer 







3(J Supervision status at offense 
52 Factors cited - a baala 
for departure sentence: 
wmcATING FACTORS 
0 A. VICllm lrwolv_.,t 
0 a 0.fendanl Ultcler o..nu 
O c. o.1..aanr1 Menml eapec;iy 
0 0. OftenM Acr::UlnpfillUICI by AllollMr 
0 E. o.Mndel'lrs Miftor Role 
0 F. Oe1enc1anrs ~..Staie 
0 G. Henn « L.Dss Less ll'IM Typcal 
0 H. ~n Free lor $iinilicant Period 





0 A. Oehbe,.le CNelty ID VClim 
0 a VtCllln Panlic:uleny V'*'-lff 
0 C. Vio*- T-.n:I VIClllll ot Wiiner.1 
0 0. p.,.n.nt Similar Ollenu1 
0 E. WNponUM 
·OF. VIOlalionof PutllicTrvsr 
0 G. Mufl!M Viclms ot lnc:iclens 
0 H. Cnne Pwt °' ~llCI Ooenuion 
0 l Pennenent ~ ID Person 
0 J. loWmll.oss GrMlet lhln Typical 





Dichotomous Variables Used in Regression Analyses 
Criminal History collapses the nine categories of criminal history to two 
categories. One category combines criminal history categories H and I, 
which contains offenders with no criminal convictions or no felony 
convictions. The other category combines criminal history categories A 
through G, which may have numerous misdemeanor and felony 
convictions. The dichotomous criminal history variable permitted 
comparison of offenders with no or very limited criminal history, with 
those that have a more extensive criminal history. 
Tufil of Crime combines the two less legally serious types of assault. 
Assault III and Attempted Assault II were combined because they both 
receive the same seriousness ranking. Combined, they represent the less 
serious category of felony assault. The other three crimes, Assault II, 
Attempted Assault I and Assault I are grouped together into another 
category to represent the more legally serious crimes. 
Departure is a variable created to indicate the presence or absence of a 
sentencing guidelines departure. 
Supervision status was created by combining both kinds of supervision 
statuses. One category represented offenders who were under some form 
of correctional supervision status at the time of the commission of the 
assault. The second category represents intimate offenders under no 
supervision status at the time of the commission of the crime. 
Presumptive sentence was created by including offenders with a 
presumptive sentence of prison in one category and offenders with a 
presumptive sentence of probation in the other category. 
County of Conviction was created by including the state's most populous 
county, Multnomah, and all other counties in another. 
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APPENDIX F 
Criminal History Categories of 
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders 
Category Intimate Nonintimate 
N = 70 N = 398 
A 1 6 
1.4% 1.5% 
B 1 17 
1.4% 4.3% 
c 8 41 
11.4% 10.3% 
D 7 28 
10.0% 7.0% 
E 3 10 
4.3% 2.5% 
F 3 31 
4.3% 7.8% 
G 9 59 
12.9% 14.8% 
H 17 70 
24.3 17.6% 




Regression Tables: Length of Probation and Prison 
Length of Probation Sentence 
Regression Table 
Independent Variable t value 
Presumptive Probation 
Length 8. 728** 
Criminal History .263 
Guidelines Departure .111 
Presumptive Sentence .038 
Type of Crime -1.061 
Intimate Relationship -1.097 
Supervision Status 2.834** 
df = 7 *p<.05, **p<.01 
Length of Prison Sentence 
Regression Table 
Independent Variable t value 
Minimum Presumptive 
Length 23.177** 
Criminal History -1.80 
Guidelines Departure .14 
Presumptive Sentence -.552 
Type of Crime .58 
Intimate Relationship -1.57 
Supervision Status .33 
p<.U), ., .... p 
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